[1] attestation.app

That is not what remote attestation is for. The operating system maintains isolation between apps, so a free software app being installed doesn't mean an app that needs high security is compromised.

For example: The UK has a digital ID requirement which is required for you to be employed in the UK. Additionally the EU digital identity services have a hardware/software attestitation that is required to run their apps. (Many of those which 3rd party software can't run).

Another example of this is the Australian eTA - (Everyone has to have a visa to visit Australia.. but the real only way to get a visa* is you have to get an electronic travel authorization which only works via an App)

https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-gu...

Apps that ban graphene-os being used:

    myGov (Australian government app)
    gov.br (Brazilian government app)
    Ticketcorner
    Authy
    Chyrpe Dating
    TextNow
    mada Pay (Saudi NFC payment app)
    McDonald's (International app used for many but not all countries not including the US)
    Dott
    My SEAT (Connectivity for SEAT cars)
    SwissID
    Volkswagen
    BKK Faber-Castell & Partner
    TK-Doc
    TK-Ident
    TK-App (Blocks access to TK-Safe, TK-GesundheitsMessenger, fingerprint login)
    IO (Italian government app which uses it to gate access to the digital wallet feature)
    PosteID (Italian postal service’s app used to access the national digital identity system "SPID")
    Singpass

[1] https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-gu...

No back button on iOS is madness and also the Android rotate screen integration is way better than iOS.

She ended up disabling the alerts entirely, which seemed a shame to me, but the ear splitting siren every 5minutes wasn't really conducive to our sanity or our dog's or our ability to actually hear the weather radio.

Moreover, it's a huge pain to get to the history of emergency alerts, which seems like a design flaw. Surprising how poorly a critical life system can be designed.

The linked post is a mess which was probably generated with an LLM. GrapheneOS does have useful properties for this even though it isn't the focus. Someone could write a proper article making a case for it even though this isn't one.

GrapheneOS is free and we recommend people install it themselves with the web installer. People can also save a lot of money getting a used device, but we strongly recommend against an older device than a Pixel 8 due to support time. A used Pixel 8a tends to be the cheapest option. An important thing to watch out for with used devices is avoiding ones which were originally sold by carriers locking their devices. Some phone sellers wrongly label locked devices as being fully unlocked.

If people buy a device with GrapheneOS instead of doing it themselves as we recommend, we a guide to follow to make sure it's genuine GrapheneOS and get rid of any strange software or configuration it ships with:

https://grapheneos.org/faq#preinstalled-devices

There are multiple ROMs involved but GrapheneOS isn't one. There's an SoC boot ROM which loads SoC firmware from the SSD, verifies it and transfers control to it. The littlekernel-based firmware stage which loads GrapheneOS isn't a ROM. GrapheneOS and most of the SoC firmware are simply stored on SSD partitions. There are A/B partitions for both the SoC firmware and the OS on the SSD. Installing (flashing) GrapheneOS involves writing out images to those partitions on the SSD and erasing an existing data partition which also happens as part of unlocking or locking the device. Those partitions aren't read-only from an OS perspective. Verified boot secures what's stored on those, not any form of hardware or firmware level write protection.

There are also boot ROMs for other hardware components. Many of those are responsible for receiving firmware uploaded by the OS to the hardware component at boot, verifying it and transferring control to it. The secure element has separate persistent firmware with a separate verified boot process since the OS isn't allowed to update it until the Owner user has successfully authenticated so it needs persistent firmware. Other hardware components mostly don't need persistent firmware and it's more secure if they don't have it.

> it's not stock

GrapheneOS will be available as the stock OS on multiple Motorola Mobility devices based on our partnership. It won't necessarily be available as the stock OS when the official support for it launches since it's not one of the minimum requirements but it's planned.

> so installing it is a customization

It's a separate OS forked from the Android Open Source Project but this terminology gives many people the incorrect impression that it's a modification of the stock OS. It leads to many people asking questions about what it removes from the stock OS and believing we removed Google integration when that was never present in the baseline. There are a lot of misconceptions which are propagated by this terminology. We don't use it and think it only serves to create unnecessary confusion and misconceptions.

> In what way is it not a custom ROM?

It was just never accurate terminology for forks of the Android Open Source Project on modern devices. The terminology originates from phone modding prior to Android and there was a time it made sense. It hasn't made sense for a long time.

There are many tiers of far easier remote attacks far easier than exploiting an up-to-date iPhone through iMessage of WhatsApp. It doesn't mean that's what happened but it's often not something that's extremely difficult. Many people use phones with years of missing security patches. It's getting increasingly easy to exploit those in the age of LLMs.

Regardless, it sounds more like a social engineering attack tricking someone into installing an invasive app and granting invasive permissions to it.

> I doubt abusers routinely pull that out?!

They do regularly use social engineering to trick their partners into setting up stalkerware or permitting it to be installed. Getting a new phone and accounts is a very helpful for people who are victims of it. They've often given access to their accounts and devices without knowing how to fully get rid of it. Reclaiming the existing devices and accounts is far easier if they have a clean one to start from where they can get technical help. It doesn't specifically need to be a GrapheneOS device, but it's a good choice in general and doesn't require being technically savvy to use or even install it.

Not really, these are available to any script kiddy as long as unpatched phones and software exists. It takes some initial effort to find them out, but that is it.

And I remember similar attacks floating around few years ago even outside domestic violence situation.

Grapheneos has 99.99% app compatibility and over 90% of banking apps are compatible.

[1] attestation.app

Interesting they don't sell the 10a, seems like a great budget phone from what I've seen.

Edit: I didn't consider taxes and initially I assumed exchange rates were more similar then they are.

Law in my profile heh (not on purpose)

Aside from that, GrapheneOS isn't read-only memory firmware and that incorrect term should be avoided since it propagates misconceptions.

Installing sandboxed Google Play is done by simply pressing the install button for it in the GrapheneOS App Store.

> It is also suspicious the preferential treatment given to that suspicious distro while all others are left in the dark.

We don't receive any preferential treatment from Google. Android's business side disallowed us from receiving any form of partner access and took away the security patch preview access given to us by Android's security team. That has been the case for years. We have security preview patch access but it isn't from either Google. Google also hasn't ever allowed us to have early access to major Android releases but that doesn't mean we haven't obtained it.

> Using hardware from a vendor that cannot be audited and every possible business interest in spying you.

You can claim this about any hardware. Pixels meet our hardware requirements and we're expanding support to multiple upcoming Motorola Mobility (Lenovo) devices meeting our requirements. There will be a growing number of Motorola devices with official support for GrapheneOS.

> Same excuse argued by Signal

GrapheneOS has never received any government grants and is fully funded by donations. Signal didn't cover up that they were received Open Technology Fund grants and other government money.

> It is easy to be transparent about donations rather than opaque: publish the operating costs and level of donations by a certified auditor without need to disclose names.

The entirety of the GrapheneOS funding comes from donations. Our finances are audited every year as a requirement for a Canadian non-profit receiving more than $500k/year in revenue. The purpose of the audits is nearly entirely to make sure we're spending all of the money. It makes sure that all the money is accounted for and being spent appropriately. A subset of our expenses are specifically checked to make sure of it. It also involves more than that but it has little to do with where the donations are received from. Donations are largely made anonymously. We can see names for Wise and PayPal donations but they're often not the legal names of individuals or companies. Most donations are received via cryptocurrency.

We can publish information on our revenue and expenses but it's not clear what that has to do with the unsubstantiated claims you're making about us or why it would stop you from doing it.

> But you won't, strangely enough.

You weren't responding to anyone that's part of the GrapheneOS project.

In what sense is anything shady about the Android Open Source Project (AOSP)?

> WiFi and SIM card chips are compromised right out from the factory

This is an unsubstantiated claims not only lacking evidence but heavily contradicted by a large amount of available evidence. It also has nothing to do with Android.

> People are usually OK with options like postmarketOS (non-Android) or with the most popular distros like LineageOS. Some jump to things like SailFishOS (attention: russian financial hands on that one).

postmarketOS and the desktop software stack it uses is far less private and secure than AOSP.

SailfishOS isn't open source like AOSP and is far less private and secure than it. It combines many of the worst aspects of desktop operating system security with low-end Android device security.

LineageOS is another fork of AOSP but doesn't preserve all the standard updates and privacy/security protections.

None of those are a hardened OS greatly improving privacy and security compared to the baseline of AOSP. None are as private and secure as unmodified AOSP. Those aren't in the same space as GrapheneOS.

> Even a cheap chinese smartphone with their "stock" Android can argue for being less shady and raise less attention to yourself than a distro which forces you into specific poisoned hardware. That is just dumb.

You aren't backing up your claims of hardware being compromised with evidence. You're also not being specific about what it is you consider to be a problem. You have an issue with us using Pixels. Does that also apply to the upcoming Motorola Mobility (Lenovo) devices too? Which specific hardware do you think would be okay to use? We need hardware meeting our requirements for updates and hardware-based security features which is why Motorola needs to improve their devices to meet our requirements. GrapheneOS also needs extensive porting work to devices due to the hardware-based security features and the need for drivers/HALs to be made compatible with the exploit protections.

GrapheneOS only supports devices that meet the baseline hardware security requirements. Pixels arent "poisoned" and there is no evidence to suggest any hardware backdoors exist, and quite a lot of evidence to show they dont exist.